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Brian Epstein has written a book with a mysterious title, The Ant Trap, and an ambitious sub-
title, Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences.  It is a work of ontology, the branch 
of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being.  More specifically, it is a contribution to 
social ontology.  At the core of the agenda of social ontology, as understood by Epstein, is 
the question that he sets out to answer: ‘What are social facts, social objects, and social 
phenomena – these things that the social sciences aim to model and explain?’ (7).  Many 
economists will suppose that such an abstruse question has little relevance for their work, 
however legitimate a concern it may be for philosophers.  But Epstein argues that social 
ontology should be the foundation of the social sciences: ‘getting the ontology right’ is an 
essential precondition for sound modelling (278).  And that requires the ‘sophisticated toolkit 
of metaphysics’ that social ontologists have at their disposal (9). 
 Epstein is in no doubt that the social sciences in general, and economics in particular, 
have not got the ontology right, and that, as a consequence of this, their models are 
inadequate.  The Introduction of the book begins with a statement of what Epstein calls ‘the 
Paradox of the Social Sciences’.  The supposed paradox is that, over the last twenty years, 
there has been an explosive growth in the collection of data about people, and so there ought 
to have been a corresponding improvement in the ability of social scientists to resolve 
questions about such things as ‘the workings of the economy, the sources of poverty, the 
prescriptions for improving education, and financial regulation’; but in fact the social 
sciences ‘are hardly budging’.  The usual clichés about the failure of economists to predict 
the 2008 crash are rehearsed; the pre-crash optimism of the usual suspects (Ben Bernanke, 
Oliver Blanchard) is mocked; Paul Krugman’s New York Times column is cited in evidence 
(1–4).  After three pages of such commonplaces, Epstein takes the ‘failures of social science’ 
to be a matter of established fact.  He then tells us that he thinks these failures result from 
modelling that has been built on unsound ontological foundations.  Hence the need to rebuild 
the foundations of the social sciences. 
 Where do the ants come in?  Epstein’s diagnosis of the failures of social science is 
that the practice of social science rests on a particular analogy between the social and natural 
sciences.  That analogy is that ‘that the objects of the social sciences are built out of 
individual people much as an ant colony is built out of ants’.  But this analogy is flawed: 
We often think of social facts as depending on people, as being created by people, 
as the actions of people.  We think of them as products of the mental processes, 
intentions, beliefs, habits, and practices of individual people.  But none of this is 
quite right […]  My aim in this book is […] to demonstrate that philosophers and 
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social scientists have an overly anthropocentric picture of the social world.  [The 
social world] turns out to be not nearly as people-centred as is widely assumed.  
(7) 
The ‘ant trap’ is the supposed error of building social science on individualistic foundations.  
Epstein presents a critique of methodological individualism and proposes a new account of 
the nature of social facts. 
 Given Epstein’s opening remarks about the failures of social science and his diagnosis 
of these failures as the result of bad ontology, one might have expected his book to contain 
some serious discussion of the theories that social scientists actually use.  One might have 
expected to be shown what ontological assumptions are built into these theories, how those 
assumptions are false, and how theory could be improved by using the ontology that Epstein 
proposes.  In fact, there is almost nothing about any of this.  Two major branches of social 
science theory – game theory and the theory of public choice (or, as it is now sometimes 
called, political economy) – seem particularly relevant to the kinds of ‘social facts’ that 
Epstein discusses, and by implication to be targets of his criticisms.  Game theory appears 
only in a one-sentence footnote, which it has to share with general equilibrium theory (20, 
note 10).  There are occasional brief citations of specific models from public choice theory, 
but no sustained discussion of the modelling strategy they embody.  Nor, incidentally, is there 
any discussion of how biologists model the behaviour of social animals, and so the claim that 
the ‘ant trap’ is a false analogy between social and natural science remains an unsupported 
assertion.1 
 It is hard to know what to make of these huge gaps in Epstein’s argument.  The idea 
that the failures of economics are so obvious as not to need to be demonstrated, and the 
conviction that these failures can be remedied by abstract philosophical reasoning which 
takes no notice of existing theory or evidence, express a breathtaking disdain for two hundred 
and fifty years of work in the discipline.  It is perhaps significant that, in Epstein’s ontology, 
facts about human society are fundamentally different from those investigated by the natural 
sciences – including facts about non-human social animals.  This (one might think 
anthropocentric) distinction allows Epstein to avoid discussing the implications of his method 
                                                          
1
 In modelling the behaviour of animals that live in colonies, as ants do, biologists need to be able to 
track the continuing properties of colonies across generations.  One might have thought that such 
group-level properties might fail to supervene on properties of the individual members of a colony in 
much the same way that, according to Epstein, supervenience fails for legislatures (see Section 2 
below). 
4 
 
of analysis for the natural sciences.  But if he is right about the social sciences, ontologists 
can correct failures in the theories of the natural sciences too, without actually examining 
them. 
 As will be clear by now, I found Epstein’s discussion of economics unhelpful.  But in 
the remainder of this essay I will overlook the hyperbole of his Introduction.  It seems to be 
intrinsic to Epstein’s understanding of the role of social ontology that it discovers the 
‘building blocks’ from which social reality is made, and that good modelling works with 
these blocks (9, 60).  Modellers should not be making their own building blocks; they should 
be using what is already there.  If this is right, ontologists can contribute to modelling without 
knowing anything about models.  I propose to read The Ant Trap as an attempt to discover the 
nature of social reality, and to consider what economists can learn from it.  I will begin by 
considering Epstein’s critique of methodological individualism. 
1.  Methodological individualism 
Epstein finds the clearest statement of the principle of methodological individualism in the 
work of the philosopher John W. N. Watkins, a student of Karl Popper.  For example: 
Now if social events like inflation, political revolution, ‘the disappearance of the 
middle classes’, etc., are brought about by people, then they must be explained in 
terms of people: in terms of the situations people confront and the ambitions, fears 
and ideas which activate them.  In short, large-scale social phenomena must be 
accounted for by the situations, dispositions and beliefs of individuals.  This I call 
methodological individualism.  (Watkins, 1955: 58). 
 It is surely beyond doubt that the dominant methodology in economics since Adam 
Smith has looked for explanations of social events in terms of the situations, dispositions and 
beliefs of individuals.  From the late nineteenth century to the present day, most economists 
have gone further, and looked for explanations of social events in terms of the situations, 
dispositions and beliefs of rational individuals.  Recent developments in behavioural 
economics have involved some retreat from rationality, but the individualism of classical and 
neoclassical economics has been retained.  The idea that explanations that are based on 
individual-level assumptions are superior to, or more satisfying than, those that are not is 
deeply rooted in the practice of economics.  (Consider, for example, the positive connotations 
carried by the idea of ‘microfoundations’.) 
 However, the ontological content of Watkins’s statement is contained in the claim that 
social events must be explained in terms of people.  The idea seems to be that, in a 
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metaphysical sense, social events just are compositions of individual-level events, and that 
any genuine explanation of social events must therefore work through individual-level 
events.  Some economists certainly have asserted claims like these as part of what they see as 
informal motivation for their models, or in describing their methodological positions.  It is 
reasonable to conjecture that many more economists have felt some intuitive attraction to 
such claims.  But that is not to say that the ontology of methodological individualism 
provides the foundation for modelling in economics.    
 Epstein (21–35) reviews what philosophers have had to say about methodological 
individualism in the sixty years since Watkins’s statement.  He reports that the current 
‘consensus view’ recognises a distinction, first proposed by Steven Lukes (1968), between 
explanatory individualism and ontological individualism.  Explanatory individualism 
maintains that social facts are best explained in terms of facts about individuals and their 
interactions, while ontological individualism maintains that social facts are exhaustively 
determined by facts about individuals and their interactions.  The consensus view is that 
explanatory individualism is a contestable claim about the most useful methodology for 
social science: it might be true that many social facts are best explained individualistically, 
but there are no good grounds for treating non-individualistic explanations as unacceptable in 
principle.  In contrast, the consensus view takes ontological individualism to be true – indeed, 
trivially true, a set of what Lukes (1968: 20) called ‘banal propositions’.  Epstein summarizes 
the consensus view as: 
We do not need to worry about the ontology of the social world.  The social world is 
nothing but people and their interactions.  Of course, we can still fight about 
methodology. […]  Maybe explanations should be individualistic, maybe not.  But 
the ontology is safe.  (23) 
 Scepticism about explanatory individualism is part of a more general philosophical 
understanding of the relationship between ‘higher-level’ and ‘lower-level’ phenomena.  The 
aggregates that constitute higher-level phenomena often have properties that are not 
possessed by the lower-level individual items of which they are composed.  For example 
(these are my examples, not Epstein’s), a scree slope is a mass of rock debris at the foot of a 
mountain, constantly being replenished by rock falls.  It normally has a constant gradient or 
angle of repose, which depends on statistical properties of the population of rocks which 
compose it, but an individual rock does not have a gradient.  Highway traffic is an aggregate 
of moving vehicles.  For a given road configuration, the relationship between traffic speed 
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and traffic flow has predictable properties that are not properties of the individual vehicles.  
In cases like these, it is clearly a legitimate scientific aspiration to try to derive higher-level 
properties from lower-level ones – to ‘reduce’ the former to the latter.  But that is not to say 
that there is anything wrong with using higher-level properties, such as angles of repose for 
rock debris or speed-flow relationships for traffic, in explaining other higher-level 
phenomena.  (Indeed, analogies between traffic flows and fluid mechanics have proved useful 
in transport engineering.)  In some cases, even the aspiration to reduce higher-level properties 
to lower-level ones may be misguided.  For example, consider the phenomenon of dorsal fins, 
as possessed by sharks and dolphins.  Considered as large-scale properties of animal bodies, 
dorsal fins have clearly recognisable properties, connected with their function of assisting the 
stability of a swimming marine animal; the analogies between the fins of sharks and dolphins 
are the result of convergent evolution.  For some explanatory purposes, it may be more useful 
to focus on the common function of fins across the species, rather than on their divergent 
lower-level properties. 
 Epstein thinks that these (and other) considerations do indeed support a ‘maybe, 
maybe not’ position towards explanatory individualism.  I agree.  But he challenges the 
second part of the consensus view, that social properties are nothing over and above the 
properties of individuals. 
2.  Supervenience  
In philosophical analyses, the intuitive idea of ‘nothing over and above’ is usually 
represented by the concept of supervenience.  Epstein offers the following definition, where 
A is a set of higher-level properties and B is a set of lower-level properties: ‘To say A 
supervenes on B … is to say an object cannot change its A-properties without there being 
some accompanying change in its B-properties’ (33).  For example, a scree slope cannot 
change its gradient without there being some accompanying change in the properties and 
positions of individual rocks.  Ontological individualism, as construed by Epstein, is the view 
that ‘social facts’ supervene on ‘individualistic facts’.  Epstein argues that this view is false 
(36).     
 The difficulty here is that, although supervenience is a well-defined concept, ‘social 
fact’ and ‘individualistic fact’ are imprecise concepts with a wide range of disparate 
applications.  It is one thing to say of a specific social science model that its social properties 
do or do not supervene on its individualistic properties.  Thus, for example, a model of public 
7 
 
choice might describe a process of pairwise majority voting, and define a concept of ‘social 
preference’ in terms of the outcome of this process.  In this case, it would clearly be correct to 
say that, in the model, social preferences supervene on individuals’ voting behaviour.  But it 
is another thing to say that, in the real world, the set of all social properties supervenes on the 
set of all individualistic properties.  That assertion seems insufficiently precise to be judged 
either clearly true or clearly false. 
 In fairness to Epstein, it must be said that he cites some distinguished scholars who 
seem to make such claims.  For example, Lukes’s set of ‘banal propositions’ includes:  
Society consists of people.  Groups consist of people.  Institutions consist of 
people plus rules and roles.  Rules are followed (or not followed) by people and 
roles are filled by people. (1968: 120)   
In relation to the attribution of agency to groups, Christian List and Philip Pettit (2011: 64) 
say: 
The things a group agent does are clearly determined by the things its members do; 
they cannot emerge independently.  In particular, no group agent can form 
intentional attitudes without these being determined, in one way or another, by 
certain contributions of its members, and no group agent can act without one or 
more of its members acting. 
 I am not sure that it makes sense to try to show that statements like these are false, 
rather than merely sententious and imprecise.  Nevertheless, it is useful to know what 
happens if one tries to take ontological individualism at face value.  This is what Epstein does 
in (as he puts it) ‘debunking’ and ‘putting to bed’ the claims of ontological individualism 
(129, 203).  Although some of the arguments he deploys for this purpose make use of the 
sophisticated metaphysical toolkit he has told us about, he also uses common-sense 
arguments which, to my mind, work just as well. 
 One of his opening examples, intended only to aid intuition, is a question about 
Starbucks Corporation:  Are facts about Starbucks exhaustively determined by facts about its 
shareholders and its employees?  The obvious answer is that they are not: 
To be sure, the employees are critical to the operation of Starbucks.  But facts 
about Starbucks seem also to depend on facts about the coffee, the espresso 
machines, the business license, and the accounting ledgers. (46) 
 At first sight, this argument might seem to miss the point.  Of course, a critic might say, 
Starbucks would not work without its espresso machines, but it is only the employees who 
perform actions with those machines.  But Epstein can reply that an action is only a special 
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kind of operation, and the machines perform operations too.  The production of an espresso 
involves an interaction between the operations of a barista and the operations of an espresso 
machine.  If we are drawing up a list of the lower-level properties on which the higher-level 
properties of Starbucks supervene, what grounds are there for excluding properties of the 
machines? 
 Another example, which Epstein works through in more detail, is an elected 
legislature (229–233).  The legislature is a social entity with an identity that continues over 
time, even though its membership changes.  Since it takes decisions, we can treat it as an 
agent.2  Are facts about its decisions exhaustively determined by facts about its members?  
One obvious reason for answering ‘No’ is that the collective decisions of a legislature are 
determined, not only by how each individual member votes, but also by the rules by which 
votes are aggregated.  Typically, the aggregation rules are not determined by the legislature 
itself.  It does not answer this objection to say, as Lukes does, that ‘rules are followed by 
people’ (just as, in the case of Starbucks, ontological individualism is not rescued by saying 
that espresso machines are operated by baristas).  A further problem is that the decisions of a 
legislature are determined by the votes of its current members, but at any time, the set of 
members has been determined by the votes of a wider electorate.  Thus, viewed over an 
extended period of time, continuing properties of a legislature’s decisions may be determined 
by continuing properties of the electorate. 
 Having (as he maintains) shown the falsity of ontological individualism, Epstein 
concludes that what is needed is more work in social ontology, to find better answers to 
questions about the nature of social facts.  But, one might ask, has the practice of social 
science actually been harmed by the consensus in favour of ontological individualism?  Or is 
the correct lesson to draw only that social scientists should be more cautious about making 
grandiose ontological claims? 
 Epstein thinks the practice of social science has been harmed, but his arguments are 
unpersuasive – as one might expect, given how little attention he pays to what social 
scientists actually do.  For example, the chapter in which Epstein discusses legislatures ends 
with a section entitled ‘Developing a new perspective on group action’.  This new way of 
                                                          
2
 In the theoretical framework used by List and Pettit (2011: 19–41), a legislature’s continuing 
identity makes it a ‘group’, rather than a ‘mere collection’ of individuals.  For it to count as a ‘group 
agent’, and so to come within the scope of their version of the principle of ontological individualism, 
it must also show ‘sensitivity to the demands of rationality’. 
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thinking begins with the recognition that the actions of groups do not necessarily supervene 
on the actions of group members.  That allows us to understand that particular kinds of 
groups (legislatures being an example) can be set up to achieve particular purposes, and that 
thousands of years of sociality have endowed human beings with strategies for ‘improving 
the design of groups, helping to ensure that they accomplish their purposes’ (234–235).  In 
the case of a legislature, the factors that can be manipulated include its rules for aggregating 
votes and the rules by which its members are elected.  Of course, Epstein is right about this.  
But if these are new ideas for social ontology, they are not new for social science.  They have 
been at the core of the agenda of public choice since the work of James Buchanan and 
Gordon Tullock (1962).3  Even if economists have sometimes made philosophically 
questionable claims about the methodological individualism of their work, it does not follow 
that the substance of that work is unsound. 
3.  Collective intentionality 
Alongside his critical discussion of ontological individualism, Epstein considers another 
philosophical analysis of social facts.  This analysis, which Francesco Guala (2007) has 
called the ‘Standard Model of Social Ontology’, is particularly associated with John Searle’s 
(1995) analysis of institutional facts.  Searle’s key formula is ‘X counts as Y in C’, where X is 
a material object, Y is a status that can be assigned to that object, and C is a social context.  
Such a formula is a constitutive rule.  ‘Counting as’ is understood as the collective 
recognition, acceptance and acknowledgement of that status within some society.  In Searle’s 
central example, X is a U.S. dollar bill, described as a material object, Y is the status ‘money’, 
understood as a medium of exchange, and C is ‘the United States’ (Searle, 1995: 40, 43–51).  
That dollar bills count as money in the United States is an institutional fact.  Searle’s 
interpretation of his formula is:  
Collective intentionality assigns a new status to some phenomenon, where that 
status has an accompanying function that cannot be performed solely in virtue of 
the intrinsic physical features of the phenomenon in question.  (46)   
                                                          
3
 Buchanan and Tullock (1962: xvi) describe their approach as ‘methodological individualism’, 
which, in the context of public choice, they define by the principle ‘Human beings are conceived as 
the only ultimate choice-makers in determining group as well as private action’.  The content of The 
Calculus of Consent is consistent with this principle, but perhaps not with Epstein’s stronger concept 
of ontological individualism. 
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 Collective intentionality and related concepts, such as plural agency and team 
reasoning, have been widely discussed by philosophers and have some currency in 
economics.  The common thread in this literature is the idea that two or more individuals can 
have mental states that relate together in such a way that there is a common attitude (for 
example, an intention, preference or belief) that each individual can properly attribute to ‘us’.  
Most contributors to this literature have wanted to deny that they were postulating some 
mysterious form of collective consciousness, and have stressed that such we-attitudes 
supervene on the mental states of individuals.  In this sense, they have endorsed a form of 
methodological individualism.  For example, Searle (1995: 25–26) heads off the criticism that 
collective intentionality assumes ‘some Hegelian world spirit, […] or something equally 
implausible’ by insisting that his analysis is consistent with the requirements of 
methodological individualism.  Collective intentions are located in the brains of individuals: 
‘The intentionality that exists in each individual head has the form “we intend”’.  
 Epstein presents the Standard Model as a position which, like ontological 
individualism, is ‘almost universally endorsed’ by social ontologists.  But, he claims, the two 
positions are in tension with one another: ‘Ontological individualism does not logically 
contradict the Standard Model, but if one is right, it is very likely that the other is wrong’ 
(50–51).  However, it turns out that what Epstein means by this is that ontological 
individualism and the Standard Model represent different relations between individuals and 
the social world.  In other words, we are looking at models of two different kinds of social 
fact.  One kind, exemplified for Epstein by properties of a ‘flow of commuters in the Boston 
metropolitan area, moving in and out of trains, subways and buses’, is the focus of 
ontological individualism.4  The other kind, exemplified by properties of a dollar bill, is the 
focus of the Standard Model (56–57).  Epstein seems to be looking for a unified account of 
the ontology of everything that could possibly be called a ‘social fact’; an analysis of a 
particular type of social fact, however well-defined, is not good enough.5  The structure of his 
                                                          
4
 This is one of Epstein’s examples, but his leading example is ‘a mob of drunken hockey fans 
storming down Howe Street in Vancouver, breaking windows and overturning cars’ (56–57).  He 
seems to be thinking of this as a collection of individuals who lack a collective conception of 
themselves as a mob.  But overturning a car requires the concerted action of several people, and is just 
the kind of case that calls for collective intentionality.  Mobs, I would have thought, typically do have 
collective intentions – for example, to attack a particular out-group, to destroy symbols of an 
unpopular regime, or (as perhaps for Canadian hockey fans) merely to cause mayhem.   
5
 Searle’s project is much more limited.  He restricts the term ‘social fact’ to facts that involve 
collective intentionality, and defines institutional facts – the subject of his analysis – as a subclass of 
social facts (1995: 26). 
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own model suggests that he has combined components of ontological individualism and the 
Standard Model in an attempt to encompass the two kinds of social fact. 
4.  Epstein’s ‘grounding and anchoring’ model 
Epstein proposes a model of social ontology whose central concepts are ‘grounding’ and 
‘anchoring’.  The grounds of a fact f are the elements of the set {g1, …, gm} of ‘more 
fundamental’ facts that provides the ‘metaphysical reason that f obtains in the world’ (70, 82).  
Metaphysical reasons are not causes: roughly speaking, g1, …, gm are what make f the case.  
In one of Epstein’s examples, f is the fact ‘The mob ran down Howe Street’; one of the facts 
that grounds f is ‘Bob, Jane, … and Max ran down Howe Street’ (85).  A frame principle is a 
general rule which specifies the grounds for facts of a certain type.  Epstein offers the 
following as an example of a frame principle: ‘For all z, the fact “z is a bill printed by the 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing” grounds the fact that z is a dollar’ (79).    
 The concept of anchoring works at a deeper level: ‘For a set of facts to anchor a frame 
principle is for those facts to be the metaphysical reason that the frame principle is the case’.  
In trying to elucidate this concept, Epstein resorts to metaphors that I find opaque.  He starts 
with the already cloudy concept of a ‘natural kind’ (roughly, a way of categorising things that 
is supposed to reflect the structure of the natural world).6  By analogy, he talks about ‘social 
kinds’.  He says that a kind needs to be held together by some kind of ‘glue’.  Natural kinds 
are glued by ‘laws of nature’ which make things of the same kind behave in regular ways.  
Anchoring principles are what glue social kinds together.  There is an ambiguity here, never 
resolved by Epstein, corresponding with his distinction between the two kinds of social fact.  
Sometimes, he seems to be thinking of social kinds as socially accepted categories such as 
dollars: he says that social kinds ‘serve a variety of functions: we employ them for 
recognizing things, classifying things in various situations, finding and correcting departures 
from norms…’.   At other times, staying closer to the analogy with laws of nature, he says 
that is useful to think of social kinds as ‘the categories we might use in the social sciences’ 
(67–69).  That suggests that a vortex in the flow of pedestrians in a congested space could be 
a social kind, even if only one scientist has so far recognised this analogy with fluid 
mechanics.  Epstein excuses the opacity of his discussion of anchoring by saying that 
                                                          
6
 Epstein argues that, because we are entitled to assume constancy of properties within natural kinds, 
natural kinds provide the basis for inductive inference in science (68).  I am not convinced that 
inductive reasoning requires any assumptions about the uniformity of nature (Sugden, 2011). 
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concepts in metaphysics are difficult to define explicitly, and that what matters is whether the 
model turns out to be useful (80–82).  So let us see how well it works when Epstein applies it 
to the case of dollars. 
 Epstein offers a supposedly superior reconstruction of Searle’s ‘theory of money’.  In 
this reconstruction, the frame principle is the one I have already quoted: ‘For all z, the fact “z 
is a bill printed by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing” grounds the fact that z is a dollar’.  
Epstein calls this principle ‘CR’ (for ‘constitutive rule’).  It is anchored by the fact ‘We 
collectively accept CR in the community’ (83).  Epstein favours this formulation because, he 
claims, it allows us to distinguish between two ways of representing the requirements of 
methodological individualism.  One is to require that the grounds of a social fact are facts 
about individuals; the other is to require that the anchors of a social fact are facts about 
individuals.  In Epstein’s reconstruction of Searle’s formula, facts about dollars are anchored 
individualistically.  In contrast, ontological individualism is a thesis about the grounding of 
social facts about things such as flows of commuters. 
 But Epstein seems not to notice that this reconstruction edits out the central idea in 
Searle’s analysis of money.  In Searle’s ‘X counts as Y in C’ formula, X refers to pieces of 
paper with various special features, including that they are issued by the Bureau of Engraving 
and Printing.  What Americans collectively accept is that these pieces of paper are money – 
that, by virtue of their function as a medium of exchange, they have value in America (Searle, 
1995: 43–51).  In Epstein’s reconstruction, Americans collectively accept the much less 
interesting fact that these pieces of paper are dollars.  But, just as the issue of U.S. dollars is 
governed by institutional rules, so too (presumably) is the issue of Belarusian rubles.  
Sufficiently knowledgeable Americans can accept – and, amongst themselves, collectively 
accept – that pieces of paper that satisfy the Belarusian rules are Belarusian rubles; but that 
does not make those pieces of paper acceptable in American shops.  Notice that this weakness 
in Epstein’s analysis cannot be remedied simply by substituting ‘money’ for ‘dollar’.  In that 
analysis, the fact that some z is a piece of paper issued by the Bureau of Engraving and 
Printing metaphysically makes it the case that z is a dollar.  But the Bureau of Engraving and 
Printing cannot metaphysically make it the case that its products are acceptable as a medium 
of exchange in America.     
 One might think that, in the case of the dollar bill, the set of more fundamental facts 
that ground the fact ‘z is money’ include not only facts about the Bureau of Engraving and 
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Printing, but also facts about what Americans collectively accept.  Epstein rejects this thought 
as revealing the error of ‘conjunctivism’ – of treating anchors as grounds. 
 He presents two arguments against this position (120–124).  The first is subtle but, I 
think, wrong.  Suppose I, as a conjunctivist, maintain that what metaphysically makes some 
piece of paper z money in America is the combination of two facts: (i) that z is issued by the 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing, and (ii) that Americans collectively accept the rule that the 
fact that a piece of paper has been issued by the Bureau metaphysically makes the paper 
money.  Epstein’s objection is that this claim asserts that Americans collectively accept a 
false proposition.  They collectively accept that (i) is sufficient to ground the fact that z is 
money but, according to the claim itself, (i) and (ii) are both required.  But this objection fails 
to recognise the constitutive content of what Searle calls a ‘constitutive rule’.7  Collective 
acceptance of a constitutive rule is a joint act that makes the rule a rule.  What Searle is 
imagining is not that each American separately declares his or her private belief that the 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing metaphysically makes paper into money.  Rather, it is as if 
Americans collectively declare that, by virtue of this declaration, the products of the Bureau 
are to be regarded by them as money.  Such a declaration is self-referential but not (as 
Epstein seems to think) circular.  Its self-referential logic is a familiar feature of exchanges of 
promises: think of commercial contracts, international treaties, marriages, or indeed 
constitutions.         
 Epstein’s second argument against conjunctivism is easier to state, but no more 
convincing as a justification of the model of grounding and anchoring.  Characteristically, he 
formulates conjunctivism as a claim about social facts in general, namely the claim that the 
grounds of every social fact include the kinds of facts that he calls anchors (115).  He then 
proceeds to argue that ‘a given social fact can obtain in possibilities where the anchors for its 
frame principles do not obtain’.  One of his examples, which he sees as ‘relatively 
uncontroversial’, is the alleged social fact that Genghis Khan was a war criminal.  He says 
that ‘we’ (by which I take him to mean present-day citizens of Western democracies) can 
recognise this as a fact because Genghis Khan ‘satisfies the conditions [of being a war 
criminal] we have anchored’ (124).  Recalling Epstein’s explanation of the concept of a 
social kind, one might question whether ‘war criminal’ is a useful category for social 
scientists trying to explain thirteenth century warfare.  Certainly, it is a legitimate scientific 
                                                          
7
 It is perhaps revealing that Epstein expresses puzzlement about this term, claiming that Searle’s 
constitutive rules ‘are neither constitutive nor are they rules’ (77). 
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enquiry to look for similarities and differences among historical instances of large-scale 
killing of non-combatants in warfare, and the actions of Genghis Khan might feature in such 
an enquiry alongside more recent events, such as the mass killing of Jews during the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941-42 or the fire-bombing of German and Japanese cities 
by Allied air forces at the end of the Second World War.  But we should not presuppose that 
the most useful explanatory categories are those that are already recognised by institutions 
such as the International Criminal Court.  The implication, I suggest, is that social scientists 
are entitled to postulate the existence of social facts that have no anchoring at all (outside the 
practice of social science itself).  I conclude that Epstein’s attempt to create a unified 
ontology of social facts is not succeeding.   
5.  Is ontology the foundation of social science? 
Probably Epstein is being too ambitious in trying to find a single model that can encompass 
the ontology of flows of Boston commuters and the ontology of dollar bills.  But, leaving 
aside the specifics of his model, I want to consider a more fundamental issue:  Is an 
investigation of the ontology of social facts the right way to build the foundations of the 
social sciences?  Or, more fundamentally still:  Do the social sciences need foundations at 
all? 
 Consider the kind of questions that Epstein is asking.  In his analysis of money, he 
takes the case of a dollar-like piece of paper that he has found in his pocket and asks, in 
effect: Is this really a U.S. dollar?  The answer to this question does indeed depend on 
whether that paper was issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing.  Epstein is treating 
this as a microcosm of the question that social ontology should address: ‘What are social 
facts, social objects, and social phenomena – these things that the social sciences aim to 
model and explain?’  The implication is that an economic model of money that is to be 
applied to the United Sates needs to be based on a true account of what makes a piece of 
paper a U.S. dollar.  But Epstein’s question about the piece of paper is not the kind of 
question that economists typically ask when they theorise about money.  Should it be? 
 As a thought experiment, suppose that the Mafia has developed a method of 
producing counterfeit twenty-dollar bills that are not detectably different from the products of 
the Bureau of Engraving and Printing.  It is circumspect in introducing these bills into 
circulation.  As a result, Mafia bosses enjoy lavish lifestyles but there is only a marginal 
effect on the total money supply.  Are these bills really U.S. dollars?  Epstein would say 
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‘No’, and that seems to be the right answer.  But are they money?  I think Epstein has to say 
that they are not really money.  Interestingly, Searle (1995, pp. 32–33) would agree.  
Discussing a counterfeit bill, he says that ‘people would think it was money even though it 
was not in fact money’.  I think what he means by this is that, according to the constitutive 
rule that Americans collectively accept, a forged bill does not count as money.  That is 
perhaps right too.  But how relevant is all this for an economic model of money as a medium 
of exchange? 
 If the Mafia’s counterfeit dollar is not detectably different from the real thing, both 
types of bill will serve interchangeably as a common medium of exchange.  A natural way of 
modelling this scenario – say, as part of an explanation of changes in the general price level 
in an economy with forgery – would be to use a model in which paper money is a 
homogeneous commodity, produced both by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing and by the 
Mafia.  In a model of this kind, the concept of ‘money’ does not correspond with Epstein’s or 
Searle’s ontological accounts of what money really is.  But in deciding to use this modelling 
strategy, the modeller does not need to engage in ontological analysis of the true nature of 
money.  The rationale for amalgamating the two types of bill into a common category comes 
from economic reasoning about the properties of trade and from an understanding of what the 
model is designed to do.  The point of this example is that modelling in the social sciences is 
not simply a matter of working with building blocks that have been shaped by the abstract 
reasoning of social ontologists.  Modellers often have to shape their own building blocks. 
 It is an unresolved question in the methodology of economics whether modellers are 
committed to the claim that their models offer stylized descriptions of certain properties or 
tendencies of the real world, or merely to the claim that models describe self-contained 
imaginary worlds that in some respects are similar to the real world.  On the first view, 
espoused for example by Uskali Mäki (1992) and Nancy Cartwright (1998), the concepts 
used in an empirically successful model might perhaps be interpreted as ‘social kinds’ in one 
of Epstein’s senses – as categories that are suitable for use in social science.  Such kinds, one 
might say, are glued together by the empirical tendencies that the model exhibits.  But that 
does not mean that those social kinds were recognised as such, prior to the work of the 
modeller: the modeller may be discovering previously unrecognised social kinds.  On the 
second view, which has been defended by Ronald Giere (1988) in the context of natural 
science and by me in relation to economics (Sugden, 2000), model-building does not take any 
stand on the ontology of the real world. 
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 I do not want to be read as arguing that social ontology has nothing to contribute to 
economics.  To the contrary, it has made a significant contribution to what I (admittedly as an 
interested party) believe to be a significant development in economics, the theory of team 
reasoning.  The central idea in this theory is that, in certain kinds of interactions within 
groups of people, each member of the group understands her own action as a component of 
the joint action of the group; in choosing how to act, each individual asks ‘What should we 
do?’ rather than ‘What should I do, given what I expect the others to do?’ (Sugden, 1993; 
Bacharach, 2006).  This approach has generated insights into how players of pure 
coordination games identify focal points (Bardsley et al., 2010) and into how people might 
understand the moral status of market transactions (Bruni and Sugden, 2008).  Although the 
research programme of team reasoning originated in the moral philosophy of act 
utilitarianism (Hodgson, 1967; Regan, 1980), it has subsequently cross-fertilized with the 
literatures of collective intentionality and plural agency (Tuomela and Miller, 1988; Gilbert, 
1989; Bratman,1993; Searle, 1995).  Much of the work in the latter literatures has been 
motivated by ontological questions about the existence and nature of we-attitudes. 
 As I understand these literatures, however, they are not concerned with the 
foundations of social science in the same sense that Epstein is.  A characteristic feature of 
philosophical work on collective intentionality and related concepts is the attention it gives to 
the details of specific kinds of interaction between small groups of individuals.  Paradigm 
cases include two singers of a duet, two people walking together, two people painting a house 
together, and two players in a soccer team executing a combination of runs and passes.  
Perhaps, as Epstein suggests, these accounts of joint action are sometimes ‘too idealized and 
intellectualistic’ (255), in something like the way that game theorists’ accounts of strategic 
interaction might be said to be too idealized and rationalistic.  Nevertheless, they have 
provided valuable models of how groups can be considered as agents with intentions and 
preferences.  Good modelling, I submit, requires the modeller to have a clear sense of the 
concreteness, specificity and credibility of the model world she has constructed, and to find 
significant similarities between features of that imaginary world and features of the real one 
(Sugden, 2000).  I believe that this is just as true for ontology as it is for economics. 
 Epstein seems to favour a different methodology.  Referring to models of collective 
intentionality of the kind that I have described, he says that he does not intend ‘to devalue the 
detailed inquiry into more restrictive cases, such as the small-group paradigm’, but 
(proceeding to devalue it) that we must not lose sight of the fact that ‘from just one special 
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sort of realization, we cannot derive a common set of grounding conditions for group agency’ 
(p. 262).  Again we see Epstein’s aspiration to create an all-encompassing ontology of social 
facts.  He is right to think that the small-group models about which he is so condescending 
will not provide ontologically-certified building blocks which social scientists will (or 
should) then put to use.  Rather, these models are contributions to the ongoing research 
programmes of social science.  But that, I think, is all to the good. 
 If social ontology does not provide the foundations for the social sciences, what does?  
I commend Otto Neurath’s (1937, p. 276) famous metaphor:  
We possess no fixed point which may be made the fulcrum for moving the earth; 
and in like manner we have no absolutely firm ground upon which to establish the 
sciences.  Our actual situation is as if we were on board ship on an open sea and 
were required to change various parts of the ship during the voyage. 
Neurath, as I understand him, is telling us that science has no foundations.    
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